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be expected that they will prove adequate. To illustrate, exemption from the
statutes may not .be claimed on the basis that sales made at prices below those
fixed by contract are restricted by the guilty retail firm to transactions with its
employees. A department store, for example, which allows a discount to its
employees on goods sold to them is bound by the act, although this may have
been its long established policy. s 0
Perhaps the widespread public benefit which these acts purport to confer
will far outweigh the apparent injustice they may unavoidably cause in some instances. At least, the legislatures have decided that the policy of the Fair Trade
laws is economically sound, and the Supreme Court of the United States has
sustained their decision.
Henry S. Machmer.

PAROLE RELEASE OF A MORTGAGE
A recent opinion of the Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey'
raises the question whether a mortgage can be released by parole or whether it
is such an interest in land that the statute of frauds requires the release of it
to be in writing. A survey of the cases reveals that there has been a divergence
of opinion. Those courts which state that the release may be by parole regard
the debt as carrying with it the mortgage and since the debt can be extinguished
by parole, the parole release of the debt releases the mortgage. Other courts regard the mortgage as giving the creditor a security which he would not have
otherwise and that if by parole this security be taken from him, it would affect an
interest in land because the released security would be the right of foreclosure.
The statute of frauds requires an agreement concerning lands to be in writing.
2
Therefore, these courts require the release of the mortgage to be in writing.
The purpose of this note is to discuss the validity of a parole release of
a mortgage. Whether an oral promise to extend the time for payment is valid
is a question not to be confused with the question here set out which is whether
3OBristol-Myers Co. v. L. Bamberger

& Co., 122 NJ. Eq. 559, 195 A. 625.

'George v. Meinersmann, 197 A. 1 (N.J., Jan. 26, 1938).
Williston discusses the problem in Contracts, Section 492, page 1420 in Volume 2 of the
Revised Edition and Section 493, page 952, Volume 1 of the tst. Edition. He says, "A contract
to pay a debt or to accept payment by way of accord and satisfaction, or otherwise, is not
within the statute, although the effect of such payment may be to discharge a mortgage, and
thereby retransfer an interest in land to the mortgagor. On the other hand, an express promise
by the mortgagee to surrender or discharge his mortgage, in so far as this involves anything
more than accepting payment of the debt, is within the statute."
2
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an oral promise to forbear foreclosure forever is binding. The courts generally
hold an oral promise to extend the time for payment to be binding. New
Jersey, which holds an oral release unenforceable, has said that, "It is well
settled, that the time of payment may be extended by parole." 3
In the recent case of George v. Meinersmann4 the plaintiff-mortgagee in
an action of assumpsit sought to enforce an oral promise made by the defendant
that he would pay the principal and interest due on the bond secured by the
mortgage given by a corporation of which the defendant was an officer. The
defendant's promise was given for an oral promise from the plaintiff to forbear
foreclosure of the mortgage. The defense raised was want of consideration in
that the promise of the plaintiff is unenforceable because oral. The court upheld the argument of the defendant and said that the plaintiff had not made an
enforceable contract with the defendant because "an oral agreement not to foreclose a mortgage covering lands is an agreement concerning an interest in lands
and is therefore within the statute of frauds." The court said, "The right to
enforce collection is a fundamental and important part of a mortgage, and an
agreement to waive such right would undoubtedly constitute an agreement concerning an interest in lands."
An early English case which discussed the question is Richards v. Syms 5
decided in 1740. Syms had borrowed from Richards and had given a mortgage and bond. Several years later Syms brought the mortgage and bond to
Richards so that he might keep them himself. Richards gave back the deeds
and said, "Take back your writings, I freely forgive you the debt." The question was whether there was a valid release. The court adopting the principle
that the mortgage is incident to the debt said, "Where a mortgage is made of
an estate, that is only considered as a security for the money due, the land
is the incident attending upon the other; and when the debt is discharged, the
interest in the land follows of course . . . . No writing is in these cases s
necessary; which shows, that even the law 7 considers the debt as the principal,
and the land to be only an incident."
In 1760 Lord Mansfield set forth' the reasons why it is consistent to hold
that the oral release should be effective. He said, "A mortgage is a charge
3Vanbauten v. McCarty, 4 N.J. Eq. 141 (1842) and Tompkins v. Tompkins 21 N.J. Eq.
(1871).
Cases of other jurisdictions in accord are: Carurl v. Crump 51 So. 744 (Ala. 1910);
Phillips v. Holland, 136 N.W. 191 (Wisc. 1912); and In re Betts, 3 Fed. Cas. No. 1371.
General statement in accord, 27 C.J. 218.
4197 A. 1, (N.J. 1938).
5S.C., 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 617, 27 Eng. Reprint 567. Cited with approval in Craft for the
use of Powell v. Webster, 4 Rawle 242 (1833).
6"In these cases" refers to actions in ejectment where a title is made under a mortgage and
evidence is given -that the debt is satisfied.

71n thq situation set out in (5) the law court would consider the estate which the mortgagee had as defeated.
SMartin v. Mowlin, 2 Burr 969, 97 Eng. Reprint 658.
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upon the land: and whatever would give the money, will carry the 'estate in
the land along with it, to every purpose. The estate in the land is the same
thing as the money due upon it. It will be liable to debts; it will go to
executors; it will pass by a will not made and executed with the solemnities
required by the statute of frauds. The assignment of the debt, or forgiving it,
will draw the land after it, as a consequence; .... .. it would do it, though
the debt were forgiven only by parol: for the right to the land would follow
notwithstanding the statute of frauds."
THE AMERICAN JURISDICTIONS WHICH FOLLOW THE DOCTRINE OF
MARTIN V. MOWLIN
Minnesota has, on several occasions, held that a parole release is valid.
In Schweider v. Long 10 the defendant payee of plaintiff's promissory note and
mortgagee upon which there was an unpaid balance of $1,850 agreed that if
the plaintiff would pay a lesser sum before the due date the defendant would
deliver up the note and the mortgage securing the same would be cancelled.
The defendant breached the contract by selling tht note and mortgage before
satisfaction and in a suit in assumpsit the plaintiff recovered the difference he
had to pay under the note and the amount he would have had to pay under
the contract. Justice Berry stated, "The agreement made between the parties
was not for the sale of the note and mortgage, but one by which the maker
of these instruments was to be discharged thereon by the payee. The agreement, is, therefore, not within the statute of frauds, so as to be required to be
in writing."
A later Minnesota case' 1 cites Schweider v. Long with approval and says
that the reason the oral release is not within the statute is that, "The effect of
the agreement is to discharge the personal liability of the mortgagors and . . .
not to modify the terms of the mortgage." This indicates that the parties must
be thinking in terms of personal liability if the oral release is to be valid but
it is submitted that this court would impute to the parties an intention to re9The holding of this case as to consideration was originally accepted in Pennsylvania in
In Whitehill v. Wilson, 3 P. & W. 405 (1832)
Wentz v. Dehaven, 1 S. & R. 312 (1815).
Chief Justice Gibson overruled Wentz v. Dehaven, saying, "It is intimated in Wentz v. Dehaven
on the authority of Lord Mansfield's dictum in Martin v. Mowlin that a parol gift or relinquishment of a mortgage debt, will release the mortgage itself, without regard to the question
of consideration or actual delivery. It is obvious that Lord Mansfield's attention was occupied
with the disputed operation of the Statute of Frauds, instead of the necessity of a consideration
or delivery." Later, in Kennedy v. Ware, 1 Pa. 445, Gibson stated that "Wentz v. Dehaven
is not to be sustained on any ground." It is submitted that these three Pennsylvania cases
overruled Martin v. Mowlin as to consideration but that they have no effect on the Statute of
Frauds doctrine therein stated.

N.W. 53 (1882).
1013
5

lFirst National Bank of Benson v. Gallagher, 138 N.W. 681 (1912).
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lease the debt even though they had talked in terms of the security and that
the result would be that the "debt carries with it the mortgage."'?
In Mutual Mill Insurance Co. v. Gordon"8 the Illinois court indicated that
it followed the majority view which is that view indicated in Martin v. Mowlin.
The court said, "A parol release of the notes as between the parties is sufficient.
The payment or discharge of the debt evidenced by the notes, operates to release the mortgage, which is but an incident to the debt."
That a subsequent purchaser of land may set up the oral discharge of his
grantor and consequently that the land is free from the lien of the mortgage
is established in the Wisconsin case of Coyle v. Davis. 4 A owned a part of a
large tract of land to all of which B held a mortgage. It was verbally agreed
between A and B that A should be released from all personal liability to pay
the amounts secured by the mortgages and that B should rely on the owners
of the other part of the tract. A conveyed to C and the court decided that B
by releasing A deprived himself of the right of insisting upon the liens of his
mortgages upon the lands owned by C and that C was entitled to have them
discharged."5
It is conceivable that the answer to the question concerning the validity of
an oral promise to forbear foreclosure might be affected by the attitude of the
court toward mortgages generally. Thus in a state which adopts the lien theory
there might be a stronger reason to hold the oral release valid than in the title
theory state where the mortgagee has the actual title to the property. No case
as yet has drawn a distinction based on the 'theory' of mortgages but one case
has indicated that a distinction is possible. It is doubtful whether such a distinction would be valid because even in the title states as between the parties
the mortgage is regarded similarly to a lien. The following language from
Malins v. Brown 6 indicates that after the interest of the mortgagee has changed
from that of lien-holder merely, he might not be able to make an oral release.
"The assignment of the bond or debt secured by the mortgage, passes the
interest of the mortgage, the debt being the principal, and the mortgage an
accessory which cannot exist as an independent debt; and until proceedings are
had for the purpose of enforcing a mortgage of real estate, the interest of the
mortgagee may be assigned without deed, by a parol transfer of the debt and
mortgage. A mortgagee has no estate, property or interest until he takes
2

1 ldem.
1312 N.E. 747 (1887).
1420 Wis. 564 (1866).
16The further reasoning of the court was that B by releasing A of liability deprived C
of a right against A and that since the right of insisting on the personal liability of A wis

one of the safeguards of the title of C, a purchaser for value without notice, B thereby deprived himself of his security. The Statute of Frauds was not argued by counsel in the case.
1'Malins v. Brown, 4 N.Y. 403 (1850).
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possession. The release of a mortgage is therefore no more than a discharge
of a chose in action or other chattel security." 17
JURISDICTIONS WHICH REQUIRE

A

WRITING

There are some courts which treat the mortgagee's interest as an interest
in land and therefore hold the release of the mortgagor invalid unless in writing. None of the cages which have held a writing necessary have stated why
there must be a writing other than that it is concerning an interest in land.
No attempt is made to answer the contention stressed in the other viewpoint
that the debt may be discharged by parole and that the mortgage being incident
to the debt, is extinguished with the debt. New Jersey has recently 18 reaffirmed
the necessity of a writing. Other jurisdictions which take this attitude are
Maine, 19 Vermont, 20 Massachusetts 2' and Alabama.22 The Massachusetts court
did not discuss the statute of frauds although the case is relied on by the New
Jersey court in George v. Meinersmann. In the Massachusetts case, N mortgaged a tract of land to D the defendant. N then conveyed to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff asked the defendant if he would receive the amount due on the
mortgage and discharge it, which the defendant agreed to do. Plaintiff sent
the money but the defendant refused to accept it. The plaintiff brought a bill
in equity praying that the mortgage deed made by N be delivered to plaintiff
and cancelled. The court answered, "We are here called on to enjoin against
the use of a mortgage deed, by verbal proof that the respondent had given
up his estate. The proposition is self-evidently false." The seif-evidency of
the contention is hardly a satisfactory answer.
THE PENNSYLVANIA ANSWER

Pennsylvania follows the majority view. There is only one case which
expressly so holds but there are dicta which corroborate this conclusion.
Ackla v. Ackla is the case in point.23 Benjamin Ackla executed a deed to John
Ackla. John gave a purchase money mortgage to secure payment. Benjamin
Ackla later gave a parol release in pursuance of a family arrangement whereby
it was agreed the mortgage should be set aside and relinquished, in consideration
of which, John the son and grantee, abandoned his claim upon the land under
17

See also Runyan v. Mersereau, 11 John. 534 (N.Y.) and McCraith v. National Bank.
104 N.Y. 414 (1887).
lOGeorge v. Meinersmann, 197 A. 1 which holds in accord with Irwin Y. Johnson, 36
N.J. Eq. 347 (1882).
1953 Me. 157.
2
0OMerrill v. Pease, 51 Vt. 556 (1878).
21Hunt v. Maynard, 6 Pick. 489 (1828).
2
2Osborne v. Waddell, 57 So. 698 (191 ).
286 Pa. 228 (1847).
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the deed made to him by his fath'er, which agreement was never acted upon.
Benjamin devised to his 5 sons, including John, his realty of which the part
previously conveyed was a part. The interests of the sons by subsequent conveyances were vested in Overton. The widow of Benjamin sought to foreclose the mortgage against John as mortgagor and Overton as terre-tenant of
the land. The court held that the release by Benjamin was valid.
"A mortgage being considered and treated merely as a security for
the payment of money, or the performance of some other act, it
is simply a chose in action extinguishable by a parol release, which
equity will execute as an agreement not to sue, or by turning the
mortgagee into a trustee for the mortgagor."
"Such a release or agreement may be established, presumptively,
by showing declarations and acts of the parties inconsistent with
an averment of the continued existence of the mortgage and repugnant to the rights and liabilities created by it, as well as by
express proof."
In the Ackla case the court relied on the parole agreement and other
inconsistent acts to uphold the validity of the release. The inconsistent acts
were the sale of ont acre of the tract granted to John without interference by
John; the will and the widow's acceptance thereof; and John's acceptance under
the will coupled with his submission to an agreement in which the widow
participated concerning the boundary line under the will.
Dictum is found in the case of Thomas's Appeal24 to substantiate the conclusion reached. In Craft for the use of Powell v. Webster25 there is an extended discussion on the fact that the debt carries with it the mortgage.
Although a parole release of a mortgage is effective it does not follow that
one should rest-secure after he has obtained it. If he is in possession of the
land a subsequent assignee of the mortgage would be required to ascertain
from him the rights which the mortgagee has under the mortgage. But if
the mortgagor were not in possession of the land he should obtain a written
release to put on record or he should have the mortgage satisfied of record.
One other factor remains. Does the Sales Act have any effect on the release of a mortgage? A mortgage is a chattel interest and under section 4 of
the Sales Act a transfer of a chattel interest must be in writing to be enforcible.
It is submitted that an extinguishment of a mortgage does not come under the
term "transfer." A transfer implies that the mortgage is kept alive thereby;
by an extinguishment the mortgage no longer continues.
Anthony Appl
2430 Pa. 383 citing Asay v. Hoover, 5 Pa. 21.
254 Rawle

242

(1833).

